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Abstract
This article presents an analysis of the secure key broadcasting scheme proposed
by Wu, Ruan, Lai and Tseng [11]. The study of the parameters of the system is
based on a connection with a special type of symmetric equations over finite fields.
We present two different attacks against the system, whose efficiency depends on the
choice of the parameters. In particular, a time-memory tradeoff attack is described,
effective when a parameter of the scheme is chosen without care. In such a situation,
more than one third of the cases can be broken with a time and space complexity in
the range of the square root of the complexity of the best attack suggested by Wu
et al. against their system. This leads to a feasible attack in a realistic scenario.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this article is to present an analysis of a key distribution scheme taking place
in a multicasting system. The system has been developed by Wu, Ruan, Lai and Tseng,
see [11], in order to propose a new solution to the problem of transmitting securely keys
in the context of multicasting. In such a context, the security of the transmission must
be coupled with the imperative of being able to manage groups of users sharing the same
key where typically one wants to deal with users leaving a group after some time, new
users joining different groups, etc... The solution of Wu et al. is based on a particular
finite field construction and its security relies on the computational difficulty of a prob-
lem that appears to have not been studied rigorously up to now.
The problem, presented in more details in Section 2 below, takes place in a finite
prime field Fp where a n-th degree polynomial f is given and consists in finding k ∈ Fp
so that f(x) − k splits into linear factors in Fp, provided that such a k exists. We will
see that this problem is directly connected with the so-called systems of power equations
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[6, 12]. Indeed, the problem is equivalent to solving an inhomogeneous system of n − 1
power equations in n variables with degrees running from 1 to n− 1. This type of equa-
tions with symmetries are known to be generically hard to solve computationally, see e.g.
[1, 3], and they often appear as test case when evaluating algorithms whose goal is to
find solutions of systems of polynomial equations. For instance, at the time of writing,
these problems are computationally intractable as soon as the degree of the system is as
large as 30, even in a finite field with moderate size. In the current situation, the degree
of the system can potentially be a few thousand and the finite field size should be chosen
larger than 280. It is however worth noticing that the special form of the equations Sn
described below might turn out to be in fact easily solvable, but the author of the article
is unaware of any algorithm capable of performing this task efficiently.
Even though the connection with systems of cyclic power equations does not lead to
a feasible computational solution of the initial problem underlying the system of Wu et
al., this link will allow us to shed light on the expected number of solutions of the initial
problem. This will be explained in Section 3. Since Gro¨bner bases methods as well as
different linearization techniques do not appear to threaten the security of the system
in the generic case, we will focus in Section 4 on the case where the order p of the finite
field has been chosen without care. Based on this assumption, two different attacks will
be presented. In particular, a time-memory tradeoff attack against the system will be
developed whose time complexity T and memory complexity M satisfy TM = O(p ln3 p)
and are both in the order of the square root of p in more than one third of the cases.
We would like to point out that in such a realistic situation the time-memory tradeoff
attack can be potentially realized on a system where the parameters have been chosen
as described in [11].
All the computations and equalities in this article should be clear from the context.
The natural logarithm and the logarithm in base 2 are denoted by ln and log2 respectively.
We will follow the standard asymptotic notations, as in e.g. [5], such as o, O and≪. We
will write f(n) > g(n)(1 + o(1)) when f and g satisfy lim infn→∞(f(n)/g(n) − 1) > 0.
2 The Key Broadcasting Scheme of Wu et al.
Let us now present the technical details of the key distribution scheme in secure multi-
casting of Wu, Ruan, Lai and Tseng. We refer the reader to the original paper [11] for
a more detailed description of the broadcasting setting and on the argumentation of the
benefits of the system. The ground parameters of the multicasting system are a large
finite prime field Fp and a family H of hash functions with values in Fp. Each user of
the system receives a private key a ∈ Fp that is fixed for a given time period and that is
known to the key management authority. When the key management authority wants
to broadcast a key k to n distinguished users of the system with private keys a1, . . . , an,
he selects a hash function h ∈ H and expands the monic n-th degree polynomial f in
Fp[x] as follows:
f(x) =
n∏
i=1
(x− h(ai)) + k = x
n +
n−1∑
j=0
bn−jx
j. (2.1)
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The management authority sends to the n users the n coefficients bj together with the
hash function h. Since the polynomial f , the so-called “secure filter” in [11], satisfies
f(h(ai)) = k for all i = 1, . . . , n, the n distinguished users can compute the key k.
The system is secure in the sense that an unauthorized user who wants to have access
to k faces the problem to recover this field element from the broadcasted parameters
b0, b1, . . . , bn−1 and h. The designers of the system state in [11, Section 3.3] that k can
only be obtained from the constant term b0 since b0 = k +
∏n
i=1 h(ai) and not knowing
the h(ai)’s makes it infeasible because the finite field size p is too large.
The distribution of the n field elements bi represents a transmission of n log2(p) bits.
The distribution of the hash function is not explained in the original setting [11], how-
ever in order to balance the security between the choice of the key k and the function
h, the number of possible hash functions should be at least as large as p. For instance,
it would be possible to fix a cryptographic hash function h, and define H = {hc}c∈Fp
where hc(x) = h(h(x) + c). In doing so, any element of H is described with a field
element. We will therefore assume that the key distribution requires O(n log2(p)) bits
of transmission. This is however not a limiting requirement in our analysis. When a
fixed hash function h is used for each broadcasting, the system is not immune against
attacks during different phases of the scheme, as described in [13]. However, when the
hash function is different for each transmission, as suggested as vulnerabilty fix in [13],
the system becomes exactly the one described above. We would like to point out that
it is in the interest of the designer to select the size of p in order to balance the security
and the transmission cost. In a multicasting environment, the value n can potentially
be quite big (up to a few millions), leading to a choice of the size of p as small as the
security concerns would allow. With this in mind, we will naturally assume in the sequel
that n < p.
The brute force attack suggested by the authors relies on testing the p possible keys
k ∈ Fp. This exhaustive search can potentially be directly operated on the system the
key is supposed to enable, but it is also possible to run the following algebraic test. The
polynomial f and the key k are such that f(x)−k splits into linear factors over Fp. This
means that f(x)−k divides the product of all linear monic polynomials, which is xp−x,
see e.g., [7]. This is equivalent to write that
xp − x = 0 mod (f(x)− k). (2.2)
Testing the previous equality can be done in O(log2(p)) modular polynomial operations,
using repeated square and multiply techniques in the ring Fp[x]/(f(x) − k), see e.g.
[9]. Any k that fulfills the previous equation is a candidate. The expected number
of candidates is analyzed in the next section and turns out to be small as soon as
n = ln pln ln p(1+o(1)). This leads to a brute force attack with time complexity O(p log2(p))
and space complexity O(n log2(p)) when n is large enough. A realistic situation could
be the following. The finite field is selected to have p ∼= 275 elements, so that the brute
force attack has a complexity of more than 280 modular polynomial operations. As soon
as n > 15, only a few k ∈ Fp will satisfy Eq. (2.2). With n = 100000 users (a factor of
40 less than some currently used pay-TV systems [10]), the multicasting system would
need to broadcast almost 1 megabyte of information.
3
3 Connection with Systems of Power Equations
Our first goal is to find an estimation of the number of possible candidates k ∈ Fp
satisfying Eq. (2.2) and to determine how difficult it is to compute one of these. In order
to do so, we will make use of a special type of polynomial equations over Fp. Let us
consider Sn = Sn(s1, . . . , sn−1), the following system of n−1 consecutive power equations
in n variables:
x1 + x2 + . . . + xn = s1
x21 + x
2
2 + . . . + x
2
n = s2
x31 + x
3
2 + . . . + x
3
n = s3
... =
...
xn−11 + x
n−1
2 + . . .+ x
n−1
n = sn−1
Notice that if one more power equation of degree n would be available, then the system
would be solvable in expected polynomial time, see e.g. [6, 12] and [7] for the use of it
in decoding BCH codes. The above system is non-trivial because this last equation is
missing. Recall that the coefficients of the polynomial
n∏
j=1
(x− xj) = x
n +
n−1∑
j=0
en−jx
j (3.1)
are explicitly related to the sum of the powers of its roots xj via Newton’s identities,
that have the following form, see e.g. [8],
ej = Fj(s1, . . . , sj−1)− (−1)
j sj
j
(3.2)
for some specific algebraically independent polynomials Fj ∈ Fp[y1, . . . , yj−1], j > 0.
For instance, e1 = s1 and e2 =
s2
1
2 −
s2
2 . The special triangular shape of the equations
(see e.g. [8]), i.e., the fact that Fj depends on s1, . . . , sj−1 only, together with the affine
dependence between ej and sj has several implications.
First, one can recursively compute sj for j = 0, . . . , n − 1 in polynomial time as
soon as the ej are given for j = 0, . . . , n − 1 (note that since we assumed n < p, the
division by j in the last term of (3.2) is never a problem). Therefore solving the initial
problem (2.2) with unknown k is equivalent to solving the system Sn with bj = ej for
j = 0, . . . , n− 1 since computing any xi = h(ai) is essentially equivalent to computing k
(factoring splitting polynomials in Fp can be done in expected polynomial time). This
gives some confidence in the general difficulty of breaking the multicasting scheme, since
solving Sn for randomly chosen s1, . . . , sn−1 seems to be a difficult task, as explained in
the introduction.
Second, the number of solutions of Sn is related to the number of possible k such
that (2.2) holds. If we consider two solutions of Sn to be the same if one is obtained from
the other by a permutation of its components, then there is a bijection between the set
of solutions of Sn and the set of possible k satisfying (2.2). Indeed, if (x1, . . . , xn) is a
solution of Sn then k = f(x0)−
∏n−1
i=1 xi satisfies (2.2), and any k satisfying (2.2) gives a
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completely splitting polynomial f(x)− k with a unique set of roots, up to permutations.
If Ωn is the set of unordered n-tuples of elements of Fp, then a solution of Sn is an
element of Ωn and |Ωn| =
(p+n−1
n
)
.
Finally, let us focus on the expected number of possible k satisfying (2.2), when
the coefficients of the polynomial f(x) are independently and uniformly distributed at
random in Fp. The triangular shape and the affine dependence described above imply
that the si are independently and uniformly distributed in Fp if and only if the same
is true for the ei. This comes from the fact that if X and Y are independent random
variables, with Y being uniformly distributed, then X + Y is uniformly distributed.
Therefore, when the n− 1 coefficients of strictly positive degree of the polynomial f(x)
are chosen independently and uniformly at random in Fp, the expected number of k
satisfying (2.2) is equal to the expected number N of solutions of Sn(s1, . . . , sn−1), when
s1, . . . , sn−1 are independently and uniformly distributed at random in Fp. For a ∈ Ωn,
let us write 1Sn(a)=0 for the indicator function of the set {a ∈ Ωn | a is a solution of Sn}.
The number N can be computed as follows:
N =
1
pn−1
∑
s∈Fn−1p
|{a ∈ Ωn | a is a solution of Sn(s)}|
=
1
pn−1
∑
s∈Fn−1p
∑
a∈Ωn
1Sn(s)(a)=0
=
1
pn−1
∑
a∈Ωn
∑
s∈Fn−1p
1Sn(s)(a)=0.
Since for a fixed a ∈ Ωn there is a unique s ∈ F
n−1
p such that a is a solution of Sn(s), we
obtain that
N =
1
pn−1
∑
a∈Ωn
1 =
(
p+n−1
n
)
pn−1
.
Let us summarize the situation with the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 Let b1, . . . , bn−1 be independently and uniformly distributed elements in Fp
and let f(x) = xn +
∑n−1
j=1 bn−jx
j . The expected number of elements k ∈ Fp such that
f(x)− k splits into linear factors in Fp is
(p+n−1n )
pn−1
.
In the context of the secure key broadcasting scheme under consideration, the previous
lemma can be used, since in this case the bj ’s being obtained by evaluating algebraically
independent polynomials at values of a cryptographic hash function, it is natural to con-
sider that they will behave like independent and uniformly distributed random variables
over Fp. Notice that
(p+n−1
n
)
pn−1
=
p
n!
·
n−1∏
i=1
(
1 +
i
p
)
=
p
n!
· exp
(
n2
2p
+ o
(
n2
p
))
. (3.3)
This asymptotic expression invites us to separate two situations, when n = O(p1/2) and
when n is essentially larger. We will not address the latter since it does not fit any
plausible setting: the prime p needs to be very large in order to give the system its
security, and n represents a number of users, making the hypothesis n ≫ p1/2 quite
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improbable. We will therefore assume from now on that n = O(p1/2) (even though
n = p1/2(1 + o(1)) is also quite improbable). In this situation, the expected number
of solutions essentially depends on the term p/n!. We will make use of the following
technical lemma.
Lemma 3.2 If n! = r then
n =
ln(r/e)
W (1e ln(r/e))
· (1 + o(1))
where W is the Lambert W function that satisfies W (t) exp(W (t)) = t and
W (t) = ln(t) ·
(
1−
ln ln t
ln t
+
ln ln t
ln2 t
+ o
(
ln ln t
ln2 t
))
= ln(t) · (1 + o(1)) .
Proof: Since ln is increasing, we have
∫ n
1 ln(x) dx 6
∑n
i=1 ln(i) 6
∫ n
1 ln(1 + x) dx and
this leads to e(ne )
n 6 n! 6 e(n+1e )
n+1. By continuity, there exist 0 < c < 1 with
e(n+ce )
n+c = r. Thus (n+ce )
n+c
e = (r/e)1/e. Solving this equation for n+ce is performed
with the help of the Lambert W function, defined as the unique solution of the equation
W (t) exp(W (t)) = t for t > 0, see [2]. In fact if xx = y then elnx lnx = ln y thus
lnx =W (ln y), leading to x = exp(W (ln y)) = ln yW (ln y) . Finally, we obtain
n+ c
e
=
ln((r/e)1/e)
W (ln((r/e)1/e))
,
and thus
n =
ln(r/e)
W (1e ln(r/e))
· (1 + o(1)) .
The final estimation of W is Eq. (4.19) of [2, page 349].
The two previous lemmas together with the expression (3.3) have the following applica-
tion:
Proposition 3.3 Let p be a prime number, n = O(p1/2), b1, . . . , bn−1 be independently
and uniformly distributed elements in Fp and let f(x) = x
n +
∑n−1
j=1 bn−jx
j. When
n > ln pln ln p(1+ o(1)), the expected number of element k ∈ Fp such that f(x)− k splits into
linear factors in Fp is O(1).
Proof: With the assumption n = O(p1/2), the value of
(
p+n−1
n
)
/pn−1 is a constant factor
away from p/n!. Solving the equation n! = p via Lemma 3.2 leads to
n =
ln(p/e)
ln(1/e ln(p/e))
· (1 + o(1)) =
ln(p)
ln(ln(p))
· (1 + o(1)).
Therefore as soon as the condition n > ln pln ln p(1 + o(1)) is fulfilled, the conclusion of the
proposition holds, due to Lemma 3.1 and Eq. (3.3).
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The effective value O(1) in the above proposition is trivially 0 if no such k exists. Com-
puter simulations tend to show that when p is reasonably large and such a k exists, as
soon as n > ln p, the value O(1) is 1 with overwhelming probability, i.e., k is then unique.
Taking back the example described in Section 2, when p is a 75 bit prime number, then
as soon as a secret key is broadcasted to n > 15 users, being able to solve Eq. (2.2) is
enough to recover k with high probability.
The consequence of the above proposition can be summarized in the following terms.
Any algorithm that solves the problem of finding all k ∈ Fp such that x
p − x = 0
mod (f(x)− k), where f(x) is a monic n-th degree random polynomial and n > ln pln ln p ·
(1 + o(1)), can be used to break the key distribution scheme in secure multicasting of
Wu et al. [11] described in Section 2.
4 Cryptanalysis of the Scheme
In this section we present two different approaches that tackle the security of the system.
The first one is effective when n is unusually large compared to p, i.e., when n is not far
away from p1/2. The second one uses the existence of average size divisors of p− 1.
4.1 Attack when n = p1/2−ε with small ε
When the number of users n is large compared to p, a simple algebraic procedure can
reveal with sufficiently large probability the secret key k. The key point is that the
polynomial f(x) takes the value k much more often than a random polynomial. In fact
for a truly random monic n-th degree polynomial g the expected number of roots of
g(x) = k is one. In our case, it is n. So for a random field element a, the probability
that f(a) = k is n/p and by computing
ra(x) := x
p − x mod (f(x)− f(a)),
we expect to find ra(x) = 0 after p/n trials. In view of Section 3, as soon as n >
ln p
ln ln p ·(1+o(1)), then a = h(ai) for some i with overwhelming probability. If the quotient
n/p is too small, then there is no hope this approach can lead to an efficient algorithm,
but if n = p1/2−ε with a small ε, then the situation is different. Computing ra requires
O(log2 p) modular polynomial operations, which leads to an attack with an expected
complexity of O(p1/2+ε ln p) modular polynomial operations. For example, when p is
a 64 bit number and n is as large as a million, i.e., n ∼= 220, then ε = 3/16, and the
complexity of the attack is roughly 250 modular polynomial operations, compared with
270 for the exhaustive search on k described in Section 2.
4.2 Time-memory tradeoff attack
A more direct approach to the problem of finding an element k such that the modular
equation xp − x = 0 mod (f(x) − k) is fulfilled is to consider k as a variable and
develop and reduce the equation in terms of the powers of k. More precisely, since
f(x) = xn+
∑n−1
j=0 bn−jx
j , then xn = −
∑n−1
j=0 bn−jx
j+k mod (f(x)−k), and the power
xp can be reduced modulo this equality. In other words, when working in Fp[x, y] we can
7
write
xp − x =
n−1∑
i=0
ci(y)x
i mod (f(x)− y) .
The polynomials ci fulfill then the condition ci(k) = 0 for all i since when y takes
the value k, the polynomial in x is identically 0. If we could compute explicitly the
polynomials ci then we could recover k since with very high probability k would be their
only common root, and therefore
x− k = gcd{ci(x), i = 0, . . . , n− 1}.
In any case, the number of linear factors is O(1) as soon as n > ln pln ln p(1 + o(1)), as
discussed in Section 3 above. However one readily verifies that the degree of the ci’s is
⌊p/n⌋ and in our case the memory needed to work with these polynomials is unrealistic
because p/n is too large, specially when n≪ p. There exists however a turn around. Let
us factorize the order of F∗p as p− 1 = d1d2 with d1 > 1. If k 6= 0 then k
d1d2 = kp−1 = 1
and thus kd1 can only take d2 values, i.e., the d2 roots of unity in Fp. In fact if β is a
primitive element of Fp and
S := {ω ∈ Fp | ω
d2 = 1} = {ωj | ωj = β
j p−1
d2 for some j = 0, . . . , d2 − 1}
then kd1 = ωj for some ωj ∈ S. Notice that the elements of S can be efficiently computed
since primitive roots are easily found, see e.g. [5]. For a given ω ∈ S, let Iω be the ideal
in Fp[x, y] generated by the polynomials f(x)− y and y
d1 − ω. In the quotient ring, we
have
xp − x =
n−1∑
i=0
ci,ω(y)x
i mod Iω,
where the polynomials ci,ω satisfy ci,ω(y) = ci(y) mod (y
d1 −ω). Therefore, the degrees
of all ci,ω are bounded by d1−1 and when ω = ωj, we have ci,ω(k) = 0. The computation
of the polynomials ci,ω can be performed quite simply: when computing x
p mod Iω by
any square-and-multiply technique in Fp[x, y], reduce at each step all the terms of degree
larger or equal than n for x with xn = −
∑n−1
j=0 bn−jx
j+ y and those larger or equal than
d1 for y with y
d1 = ω. The time-memory tradeoff algorithm consists in testing all d2
possible ω until a common linear factor of the n polynomials ci,ω is found, revealing the
secret key k. Note that the cost of the greatest common divisor computation is O(ln d1)
modular polynomial operations. The memory requirement is M = d1 log2 p bits, the
time requirement is T = O(d2 ln p ln d1) modular polynomial operations, and we have
TM = O(p ln2 p ln d1).
Clearly the quality of this approach depends on the factorization of p− 1. The case
where p is a strong prime, see [9], i.e., p = 2q + 1, with q prime, is immune against the
previous attack. However as soon as p − 1 has a factor d1 with t bits, and if sufficient
memory is available, then the time needed to compute the secret key from the public
data is decreased by a factor of roughly 2t compared to the brute force described earlier.
It is worth mentioning that the original scheme has no indication on the choice of the
special form of p. The case of the example presented in Section 2 is illustrative. When
p − 1, a 75 bit number, has a factor in the range of 240, which corresponds to a few
gigabytes of memory, the cost of the attack is reduced to roughly 245 modular polynomial
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computations, much less than 280, which corresponds to the cost of the brute force search,
and is feasible by an attacker with realistic power.
Let us briefly study the conditions required in order for the above attack to terminate
with a time and memory requirement in the order of the square root of p. This boils
down to determine how often a prime p is such that p − 1 has a factor in the range of
p1/2. For 0 6 α < β 6 1, let N(x, xα, xβ) be the number of primes p 6 x such that p− 1
has a factor d such that xα 6 d 6 xβ. There exist constants r and B, that depend on α
and β, such that
∀x > B , N(x, xα, xβ) >
rx
lnx
. (4.1)
This is [4, Theorem 7]. Taking into account that there are xlnx(1 + o(1)) primes smaller
than x, Eq. (4.1) above states that for sufficiently large x, the proportion of primes p 6 x
such that p−1 has a factor in [xα, xβ] is larger than a fixed ratio. For example, computer
simulations on prime integers ranging from 30 bits to 85 bits showed that when α = 0.475
and β = 0.5, r > 0.33 seems to fit the reality. This means that for approximately a third
of the randomly chosen large finite prime fields, the above attacks can be mounted with
a time and memory complexity in the range of the square root of the field size. The ratio
jumps to r > 0.59 for α = 0.33 and β = 0.5, corresponding to a time-memory tradeoff
of at least 2/3-1/3 bit complexity in almost 60 % of the cases.
5 Conclusion and Acknowledgments
The key distribution system developed by Wu et al. aims at solving the problem of
key management in a potentially insecure multicasting environment. We presented an
analysis of the system by shedding light on the security implied in the choices of the two
main parameters of the scheme p and n. Two different attacks have been presented, both
being efficient when some conditions are fulfilled, exhibiting a family of weak parameters.
For instance, when n ≪ p and p is a strong prime, the scheme is immune against both
the attacks.
The author would like to thanks Jens Zumbra¨gel for early talks on this subject, as
well as the people of the Vienna Workshop for fruitful discussions.
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